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REMEDY FOR ABUSES OF 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Essay is part of a larger project exploring the possibility that, 
contrary to much of the prevailing scholarship, judicial supervision of 
the prosecutor’s charging decision—through both expansive judicial 
interpretation of current ethics rules and judicial enactment and 
enforcement of more extensive ethics rules—might serve as a viable 
and effective mechanism for meaningful review and regulation. In a 
forthcoming article,1 Bruce Green and I identify and respond to some 
of the reasons scholars have generally steered clear of considering the 
option that judges might play a more robust role in supervising 
prosecutors’ charging discretion by implementing enhanced 
disciplinary rules addressing charging decisions.2 Specifically, we 
suggest that much of the leading scholarship seems to be built on the 
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1.  See Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutors as a
Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis, 14 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2016). 
2.  See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 959 (2009): 
Bar disciplinary rules understandably limit themselves to clear, gross, and discrete 
misconduct, such as lying, withholding evidence, fraud, and embezzlement. Bar rules 
cannot capture the myriad complex factors that rightly or wrongly influence patterns of 
prosecutorial discretion across cases. Writing and policing rules from the outside will 
not work any better for bar authorities than it has for courts, so bar authorities have not 
even tried to do so.  
Id. at 978. 
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premise that, as a descriptive matter, as part of the doctrine of 
separation of powers, and for practical reasons, courts lack the 
authority and ability to review the prosecutorial charging decision.3 We 
argue, however, that the nearly categorical assumption among many 
scholars that courts do not have the authority to review charging 
decisions reflects an undue attention to federal law and federal courts, 
and as a result, reveals only part of the story. 
Based on an examination of the state court experience, we find that, 
contrary to the assumptions of many scholars,4 both as a descriptive 
matter and a normative matter, in many states and in a variety of 
contexts, courts have exercised both adjudicatory and disciplinary 
review of charging decisions.5 In so doing, state courts have sometimes 
 
 3.  For example, Angela Davis cites a number of ways in which the law insulates 
prosecutors’ abuse of discretion from effective judicial review, including the harmless error 
doctrine, which precludes reversal of a conviction as a remedy for many forms of prosecutorial 
indiscretion, obstacles to discovery necessary to demonstrate prosecutorial abuse of power, 
immunity from civil liability for prosecutors, and a general reluctance among courts to exercise 
their supervisory power out of concern for the separation of powers. See Angela J. Davis, The 
American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 
412–15 (2001).  
  See also Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons 
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 872 (2009) (finding that “federal judges continue 
to rubber stamp cooperation, charging, and plea decisions”); Ellen S. Podgor, Race-Ing 
Prosecutors’ Ethics Codes, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461, 462–64 (2009); Anne Bowen Poulin, 
Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution: Enforcing Protection After United States v. 
Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1071, 1119 (1997); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of 
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1546 (1981) (“Courts often justify their refusal to 
review prosecutorial discretion on the ground that separation-of-powers concerns prohibit such 
review.”); id. (finding that courts are reluctant to “regulat[e]” the prosecutor’s charging power, 
“for example, by preventing him from using the threat of a charge under a ‘three-time loser’ 
statute to obtain guilty pleas, or by requiring him to justify charging decisions with reasons that 
are subject to judicial review”); id. (“The hands-off approach of the courts seems to reflect their 
view . . . that it would be unwise to interfere with prosecutors’ ability to manage the business of 
criminal justice.”).  
 4.  See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 2, at 970 (“The separation of powers, courts hold, forbids 
judicial interference with prosecutorial discretion to decline to file charges.”); Davis, supra note 
3, at 410 (stating that “the decision to forego charges is entirely within the discretion of the 
prosecutor”); Vorenberg, supra note 3, at 1546 (“These considerations have prevented courts 
from forcing a prosecutor to initiate criminal proceedings.”).  
 5.  For examples of scholarship acknowledging and, at times, critiquing the more active role 
many state courts play in reviewing prosecutors’ charging decisions, see, e.g., Valena E. Beety, 
Judicial Dismissal in the Interest of Justice, 80 MO. L. REV. 629 (2015); Bibas, supra note 2, at 970 
n.43; Beth A. Brown, The Constitutional Validity of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 
133(b)(2) and the Traditional Role of the Pennsylvania Courts in the Prosecution Function, 52 U. 
PITT L. REV. 269 (1990); Darryl K. Brown, Judicial Power to Regulate Plea Bargaining, 57 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1225 (2016); Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion and Its Limits, 50 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 643 (2002); Wayne A. Logan, A Proposed Check on the Charging Discretion of 
Wisconsin Prosecutors, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1695 (1990); Gary E. O’Connor, Rule(Make)r and 
Judge: Minnesota Courts and the Supervisory Power, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 605 (1997); Frank 
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deemed separation of powers arguments less compelling in the face of 
judicial responsibility and authority to insure the fair administration of 
justice.6 Moreover, even to the extent that most courts remain reluctant 
to review charging decisions through the adjudicatory process, the 
courts in every state exercise the inherent authority to regulate the 
practice of law in their own jurisdiction, through which they enact and 
implement ethics rules that regulate the practice of law and, at times, 
subject lawyers to discipline. Thus, we conclude that, in further exercise 
of this inherent authority, courts have the ability to play a more active 
role in reviewing charging decisions by interpreting current rules and 
adopting enhanced rules regulating the charging decision.7 
Building on these observations and arguments, this Essay briefly 
considers the potential utility of disciplinary regulation as a remedy for 
abuses of prosecutorial discretion. Toward that goal, the Essay explores 
whether, in comparison with other approaches, disciplinary rules might 
provide a more appropriate and effective mechanism for responding to 
the problem of abuse of prosecutorial power. Part I of the Essay briefly 
documents concerns over actual and perceived abuses of prosecutors’ 
charging power. Part II then summarizes and critiques a number of 
leading proposals for reform of prosecutors’ charging discretion.  
Finally, Part III analyzes the potential utility of disciplinary review as 
an alternative avenue of reform. On the basis of this analysis, the Essay 
concludes that judicial supervision of prosecutors through the 
disciplinary process may not be vulnerable to some of the objections 
that have been leveled against other proposals. 
 
 
 
 
J. Remington & Wayne A. Logan, Frank Miller and the Decision to Prosecute, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 
159 (1991); Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutorial Guidelines and the New Terrain in New Jersey, 109 
PENN ST. L. REV. 1087 (2005). 
  See also Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: 
Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 
1433 (1984); Amy R. Mashburn, A Clockwork Orange Approach to Legal Ethics: A Conflicts 
Perspective on the Regulation of Lawyers by Federal Courts, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 473 (1995); 
Brandon K. Crase, Note, When Doing Justice Isn’t Enough: Reinventing the Guidelines for 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475 (2007); Robert Heller, Comment, 
Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal Law: The Need for Meaningful Judicial 
Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309 (1997). 
 6.  See Green & Levine, supra note 1, at Part III.A. 
 7.  See id. at Part III.B. 
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I.  BACKGROUND—THE PROBLEM: ABUSE OF PROSECUTORIAL 
DISCRETION 
The wide scope of prosecutorial discretion has long been the 
subject of discussion and, at times, considerable criticism and concern, 
among courts, scholars, bar associations, and law reform organizations.8 
Of the various ways prosecutors exercise discretion, commentators 
have often focused on charging decisions as the most significant, both 
in importance and in the degree to which, many scholars maintain, 
these decisions remain largely unchecked.9 Indeed, through the 
decision whether or not to file charges, the prosecutor determines if a 
particular individual will face the machinery of the criminal justice 
system, while other discretionary decisions, such as those relating to 
what charges to file and the terms of a plea bargain, have a 
substantial—and often determinative—effect on the outcome of a case. 
The enormous power that prosecutors wield through charging 
decisions has led to claims and concerns revolving around actual and 
perceived abuses of power, including political favoritism,10 personal 
self-interest,11 undercharging,12 overcharging,13 arbitrariness,14 and 
bias.15 The titles of leading works in this area illustrate both the range 
and the level of alarm among leading scholars: some have decried the 
current state of “arbitrary justice”16 and “the threat of tyranny.”17 
Others have gone “in search of the virtuous prosecutor”18 or have 
 
 8.  The literature on these issues is far too voluminous to list here. Early works of note 
include KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969), and Vorenberg, supra note 3. 
 9.  See, e.g., Davis, supra note 3, at 408 (“The charging decision is arguably the most 
important prosecutorial power and the strongest example of the influence and reach of 
prosecutorial discretion.”); Vorenberg, supra note 3, at 1525 (“There are good reasons to see 
prosecutors’ virtually unlimited control over charging as inconsistent with a system of criminal 
procedure fair to defendants and to the public.”). See also Mitchell Stephens, Ignoring Justice: 
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Ethics of Charging, 35 N. KY. L. REV. 53 (2008). 
 10.  See, e.g., Anthony S. Barkow & Beth George, Prosecuting Political Defendants, 44 GA. 
L. REV. 953 (2010); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. 
REV. 837, 847–48 (2004); Note, Prosecutor’s Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 1057 (1955). 
 11.  See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2463, 2470–73 (2004). 
 12.  See, e.g., Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. 
L. REV. 29 (2002). 
 13.  See, e.g., Kyle Graham, Overcharging, 11 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 701 (2014).  
 14.  See generally ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE 
AMERICAN PROSECUTOR (2007).  
 15.  See, e.g., Podgor, supra note 3; Poulin, supra note 3. 
 16.  DAVIS, supra note 14.  
 17.  Davis, supra note 3. 
 18.  Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15 
AM J. CRIM. LAW 197 (1988).  
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called for “prosecutorial accountability”19 and “policing of 
prosecutors.”20 And others have suggested mechanisms for “decent 
restraint of prosecutorial power”21 and “meaningful review of 
prosecutorial discretion.”22 In turn, many have responded with 
proposals to rein in the scope of the prosecutor’s charging discretion, 
with the aim of curbing some of the claimed and documented abuses 
committed by prosecutors in the exercise of their discretion. The next 
Part of this Essay summarizes and critiques a number of leading 
proposals for reform. 
II.  PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
One common avenue of reform looks to the legislature as a source 
of restraint on the prosecutor’s charging discretion. For example, one 
leading scholar proposes legislative action to limit the discretion of 
prosecutors in plea bargains, through requirements that prosecutors 
issue “guidelines indicating how they will make charging and 
bargaining decisions,”23 legislative oversight of prosecutors’ policy 
judgments in the plea bargaining process,24 and criminal code revision 
to effect “the reassertion of legislative authority over policymaking on 
crime and punishment.”25 
However, as others have argued, legislatures are not likely to take 
the lead in such reform efforts. In the words of one commentator, 
“hoping for legislatures to rein in prosecutorial discretion is a pipe 
dream” because “[b]y and large . . . legislatures broaden prosecutorial 
power to burnish their tough-on-crime credentials. They lack incentives 
to regulate prosecutors systematically.”26 As another scholar put it, in 
the context of the federal system, “[t]he political process 
overwhelmingly favors prosecutors. Any oversight by Congress would 
serve largely to make sure that prosecutors are being sufficiently tough 
. . . . [I]t is hard to imagine a scenario where Congress would put in place 
an oversight scheme that would offer greater protections for 
defendants.”27 
 
 19.  Bibas, supra note 2. 
 20.  Barkow, supra note 3. 
 21.  Vorenberg, supra note 3.  
 22.  Heller, supra note 5. 
 23.  Vorenberg, supra note 3, at 1562. 
 24.  See id. at 1566–67. 
 25.  Id. at 1568.  
 26.  Bibas, supra note 2, at 966.  
 27.  Barkow, supra note 3, at 911. Similar obstacles would seem to impede other proposals 
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Alternatively, a number of scholars have proposed that, in place of 
external forces such as legislative action, a more promising avenue for 
reform of prosecutorial discretion would grow out of internal efforts to 
structure the prosecutor’s office in a way that institutionalizes internal 
checks on prosecutors’ charging decisions.28 However, such proposals 
may face significant obstacles to effective implementation, as they 
appear to lack enforcement mechanisms necessary to require 
prosecutors’ offices to comply with a restructuring of their operations.29 
 
for legislative reform. For example, Davis introduces mechanisms such as “strengthening the 
electoral and appointments process” for prosecutors, through “public information campaigns,” 
“prosecution review boards,” and “racial disparity studies.” See DAVIS, supra note 14, at 183–89; 
Davis, supra note 3, at 462–63. Davis acknowledges, however, that many of these reforms will 
require legislative action because, rather than voluntarily accepting these provisions, prosecutors 
would likely resist many elements of her proposals. See DAVIS, supra note 14, at 189–91; Davis, 
supra note 3, at 463. Cf. Poulin, supra note 3, at 1119–22 (suggesting that Congress impose 
mandatory record-keeping for prosecutors).  
  In place of enacting legislation, which he finds both unlikely and unworkable, Bibas 
suggests that legislatures might hold oversight hearings, through which they and their staffs could 
have an opportunity to investigate and question prosecutors regarding their offices’ policies and 
actions. See Bibas, supra note 2, at 967–68 Here too, though, Bibas argues that legislatures would 
not have full access to information and data necessary for adequate review and recommendations, 
and in any event, he concludes, they would find difficulty devising meaningful and efficient 
guidelines for prosecutors to follow. See id. at 968–69.   
 28.  See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 3, at 873 (proposing to “look[] within the prosecutor’s office 
itself to identify a viable corrective on prosecutorial overreaching[] . . . through separation-of-.”); 
Poulin, supra note 3, at 1122–24 (proposing internal reforms). 
 29.  For example, Barkow proposes no less than a “redesign of the prosecutor’s office,” 
requiring that prosecutors implement a form of “structural separation” modeled after the 
practices of administrative agencies. Barkow, supra note 3, at 895–97. In particular, she aims to 
“redefine those tasks that occur in a prosecutor’s office that instead should be labeled as 
adjudicative and performed by someone not otherwise involved in the case.” Id. at 897. Thus, 
“[t]he fundamental aim is to prevent people who develop a will to win or who will be exposed to 
legally irrelevant information about a defendant from making key determinations about the 
defendant’s guilt and what punishment he or she deserves.” Id. In short, “prosecutors who are 
involved with the investigation of a case . . . should be prevented from making adjudicative 
decisions.” Id. at 898. Classifying both charging and plea determinations as adjudicative, Barkow 
suggests that this model will help provide internal checks on prosecutorial abuses of discretion. 
Id. 
  However, Barkow does not provide an enforcement mechanism that would require 
prosecutors’ offices to comply with a major restructuring of their operations, which, Barkow 
concedes, would entail a “reject[ion]” of vertical prosecution, among other prevailing models. Id. 
at 897 n.157. Indeed, Barkow acknowledges that her proposal would face resistance among many 
prosecutors’ offices, and she recognizes the difficulty in trying to “prompt prosecutors to change 
the view they have of themselves.” Id. at 917. In response, she suggested that “a new 
administration with a new outlook on prosecutorial power might lead to a rethinking of how 
prosecutors do their job,” and that “Congress and certain defense interests could also play a role.” 
Id. However, in light of the absence of any such rethinking by the administration, coupled with 
Barkow’s own rejection of the likelihood that Congress will play a strong role in prosecutorial 
reform, questions remain as to the implementation of her proposals.  
  Similarly, Bibas proposes a number of structural reforms to the internal governance of 
prosecutors’ offices that he sees as improving the way prosecutors exercise their discretionary 
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In light of the challenges confronting many of these proposals, the 
next Part of this Essay considers the potential utility of disciplinary 
regulation as an alternative avenue of reform. 
III.  THE POTENTIAL UTILITY OF DISCIPLINARY REGULATION 
Notably, among the various reforms that have been suggested in 
response to abuses of the prosecutor’s discretionary power, relatively 
few proposals have looked to a judicial role in reviewing and regulating 
the prosecutor’s charging decisions.30 Moreover, although many 
scholars have lamented the lack of attention to prosecutors’ charging 
decisions in codes of professional conduct,31 scholarship in this area has 
largely ignored the potential role ethics rules might play as a 
meaningful check on prosecutors’ charging discretion.32 
For example, critics of proposals for a legislative response find it 
untenable to expect elected officials to enact legislation that will be 
perceived as hindering prosecutors’ ability to fight crime.33 Judges, in 
contrast, who do not face the same political pressures as legislatures, 
are less likely to be deterred by this kind of negative public opinion. 
 
power. See Bibas, supra note 2, at 468–69. Like Barkow, however, having rejected the role of 
legislatures and judges in enacting reforms, Bibas does not explain how and why prosecutors’ 
offices would be inclined to adopt these proposals for change. Cf. Podgor, supra note 3, at 474–75 
(proposing “better discretion” through a “multi-dimensional approach” to charging decisions, 
providing a “compassionate alternative,” but acknowledging that “[i]t is difficult to ensure that 
prosecutor will make use of this guidance”). 
 30.  In addition, many of these proposals are limited in the role they envision for judges and 
ethics rules in reform efforts. For example, in the context of proposing a legislative requirement 
that prosecutors issue guidelines for charging decisions, Vorenberg suggested that as part of a 
preliminary hearing, courts should review whether an individual charge was “a substantial and 
unjustified deviation from the prosecutor’s own stated policy and practice.” Vorenberg, supra 
note 3, at 1570. Yet, Vorenberg ultimately limited judicial review to “merely requir[ing] 
prosecutors to state how they will employ their judgment and hold[ing] them to those statements.” 
Id. at 1571. Cf. Heller, supra note 5 (calling for meaningful judicial review of federal charging 
decision through discovery modeled after exceptions to privilege in cases of fiduciary 
relationship). 
 31.  See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 14, at 143–61; Kenneth J. Mellili, Prosecutorial Discretion in 
an Adversary System, 1992 B.Y. U. L. REV. 669, 678–82 (1992); Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial 
Ethics As Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1587–90 (2003); Samuel J. Levine, The Yale L. 
Rosenberg Memorial Lecture: Taking Prosecutorial Ethics Seriously: A Consideration of the 
Prosecutor’s Ethical Obligation to “Seek Justice” in A Comparative Analytical Framework, 41 
HOUS. L. REV. 1337, 1341–42 & n.10 (2004). 
 32.  For example, Davis briefly suggests “strengthening the disciplinary process” and 
perhaps modifying ethics rules as a possible response to prosecutorial abuse. DAVIS, supra note 
14, at 181–83. However, she does not offer a detailed description of any such changes to the rules. 
Cf. Crase, supra note 5 (proposing a rule providing a balancing test for the prosecutor to decide 
whether charges are justified in a given situation, weighing factors of the motivation of prosecutor, 
the degree of harm to the defendant, and the impact on society).  
 33.  See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
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Many judges are appointed, but even those judges who are elected are 
generally not subject to the same form or degree of political 
electioneering and public scrutiny that would tend to chill their 
willingness or ability to review the conduct of prosecutors. Indeed, 
judges serve both adjudicatory and disciplinary functions that entail 
substantial oversight of prosecutors, including, when necessary, issuing 
decisions and orders that favor criminal defendants and thwart the 
efforts of prosecutors. Similarly, judges are more likely than legislators 
to curtail prosecutorial discretion, as they deem necessary, through the 
enactment and implementation of disciplinary rules. 
Other common proposals, calling for internal reform of the 
structure or policies of prosecutors’ offices, are often challenged on the 
basis that, absent a mechanism of outside enforcement, prosecutors will 
lack an incentive to undertake meaningful change.34 Reforms based on 
disciplinary rules may not face these obstacles. Judges would rely on 
their inherent authority to supervise and, when necessary, discipline 
prosecutors, rather than requiring legislative action or hoping that 
prosecutors will recognize for themselves the benefits of changing their 
longstanding policies, structures, and underlying attitudes. At the same 
time, to the extent that internal reforms proposed by scholars may play 
an integral role in preventing discretionary abuse by prosecutors, 
disciplinary rules may provide an incentive for prosecutors’ offices to 
undertake restructuring in an effort to comply with the rules and avoid 
the sanction of courts. Thus, disciplinary rules might help provide an 
enforcement mechanism for some of the internal changes scholars have 
envisioned. 
Perhaps most significantly, relying on the disciplinary approach 
empowers judges to recognize and respond to abuses of prosecutorial 
discretion in a way that is not possible within the adjudicative process. 
As courts and scholars have noted, legal principles such as the harmless 
error doctrine,35 obstacles to discovery, and civil immunity for 
prosecutors,36 among others, place considerable limitations on 
adjudicative remedies available in response to a prosecutor’s abuse of 
discretion.37 In fact, when courts—including the United States Supreme 
Court—invoke these legal principles, they sometimes lament their 
inability to craft appropriate remedies for prosecutorial abuse of 
 
 34.  See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 35.  See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983). 
 36.  See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). 
 37.  See, e.g., Davis, supra note 3, at 412–15. 
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discretion by means of the tools of adjudication. Not infrequently, they 
call for action through other mechanisms, often identifying the 
disciplinary process as an appropriate forum.38 Doctrines such as 
 
 38.  For example, in the landmark 1976 case Imbler, the United States Supreme Court held 
that prosecutors acting in the scope of their duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution 
are entitled to absolute immunity from damages under a civil rights suit. 424 U.S. at 409. At the 
same time, the Court “emphasize[d] that the immunity of prosecutors from liability . . . does not 
leave the public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs.” Id. at 428–29. 
Specifically, in addition to noting the potential applicability of criminal punishment for some 
forms of willful prosecutorial misconduct, the Court relied on the availability of discipline as a 
significant “check[] undermin[ing] the argument that the imposition of civil liability is the only 
way to insure that prosecutors are mindful of the constitutional rights of persons accused of 
crime.” Id. at 429. In the words of the Court, “a prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among officials 
whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional 
discipline by an association of his peers.” Id.  
  The Court expressed a similar approach in a 1983 opinion affirming the doctrine of 
harmless error. In Hasting, reviewing allegations that the prosecutor’s comments at trial violated 
the defendant’s constitutional rights, the Court referred to the “exercise of supervisory powers” 
through which federal courts have the authority “within limits” to “formulate procedural rules 
not specifically required by the Constitution or the Congress.” 461 U.S. at 505. Specifically, the 
Court delineated three “purposes underlying use of the supervisory powers . . . : to implement a 
remedy for violation of recognized rights; to preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a 
conviction rests on appropriate considerations validly before the jury; and finally, as a remedy 
designed to deter illegal conduct.” Id. (citations omitted). The Court found that because any 
violations of the defendant’s rights were harmless, there was no need for judicial exercise of 
supervisory power to fashion an adjudicatory remedy. According to the Court, the presence of 
harmless error at trial neither requires a remedy of reversal nor significantly implicates the 
integrity of the adjudicatory process. See id. at 506.  
  Finally, addressing the purpose of exercising supervisory power to deter improper 
conduct by prosecutors, the Court concluded that “deterrence is an inappropriate basis for 
reversal” in the face of harmless error. Id. Instead, the Court found, “means more narrowly 
tailored to deter objectionable prosecutorial conduct are available.” Id. In particular, the Court 
suggested that “the court could have dealt with the offending argument by directing the District 
Court to order the prosecutor to show cause why he should not be disciplined, or by asking the 
Department of Justice to initiate a disciplinary proceeding against him . . . . The court could have 
publically chastised the prosecutor by identifying him in its opinion.” Id. at 506 n.5.  
  In a 1988 case, the Court addressed similar issues in the context of a trial court’s 
supervisory authority over prosecutorial conduct in a grand jury. In Bank v. Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. 
250 (1988), the Court reviewed an appeal of a district court decision dismissing an indictment as 
a remedy for prosecutorial misconduct in a grand jury proceeding. Among other findings, the 
district court concluded that “[t]he supervisory authority of the court must be used in 
circumstances such as those presented in this case to declare with unmistakable intention that 
such conduct is neither ‘silly’ nor ‘frivolous’ and that it will not be tolerated.” United States v. 
Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. 1324, 1353 (1984).  
  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a trial court’s supervisory authority does not 
include the power to dismiss an indictment when prosecutorial misconduct during grand jury 
proceedings constituted harmless error. Alternatively, the Court noted, “[e]rrors of the kind 
alleged in these cases can be remedied adequately by means other than dismissal.” Bank, 487 U.S. 
at 263. As in Hasting, the Court identified a number of disciplinary remedies: “the court may 
direct a prosecutor to show cause why he should not be disciplined and request the bar or the 
Department of Justice to initiate disciplinary proceedings against him. The court may also chastise 
the prosecutor in a published opinion.” Id. As the Court explained, “[s]uch remedies allow the 
court to focus on the culpable individual rather than granting a windfall to the unprejudiced 
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harmless error and immunity are inapplicable to disciplinary decisions, 
in which the issue of prosecutorial ethics can be examined independent 
of questions of the availability of criminal or civil remedies. 
Similarly, because the question of discipline turns on the conduct of 
the prosecutor rather than on the outcome of the case, the disciplinary 
process provides a forum for reviewing the ethics of prosecutorial 
charging discretion in scenarios generally not subject to adjudicatory 
review. For example, judges might exercise disciplinary review, as 
appropriate, when a prosecutor declines to file charges, when a 
defendant is found not guilty, or when the prosecutor’s decision to file 
charges against a particular defendant is supported by probable cause 
but is the product of an arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory decision-
making process. In short, because the disciplinary process is not 
susceptible to many of the doctrinal and procedural limitations facing 
the adjudicatory process, enhanced disciplinary rules will fill the 
current gap in judges’—and the legal system’s—ability to respond 
effectively to instances of abuse of prosecutorial discretion. 
In addition to doctrinal limitations, judges can be reluctant to 
engage in a detailed examination of prosecutors’ charging decisions out 
of concern for the confidentiality of information in prosecutors’ files.39 
Accordingly, some argue, judges are simply not equipped to respond 
adequately to systemic abuses, including arbitrary and selective 
prosecution, overcharging, and discriminatory plea bargain policies.40 
 
defendant.” Id.  
 39.  See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 2, at 970 (finding that judges are concerned that “revealing 
prosecutorial information could ‘chill law enforcement . . . [and] undermine prosecutorial 
effectiveness.’”); id. at 962 (“Ex post, case-by-case review is no answer, particularly review by 
outsiders without access to confidential police and prosecutor files.”). See also Barkow, supra note 
3, at 908–09 (noting the volume of cases that courts would be required to review and the need for 
secrecy in many prosecutorial charging decisions).  
 40.  Bibas cites a number of rationales that courts have invoked for the hands off approach 
to reviewing prosecutors’ charging decisions. For example, Bibas observes that courts place 
obstacles in the way of possible discovery of prosecutorial abuse of discretion, and that judges 
“are hesitant to review decisions about whether to prosecute because they are less competent to 
weigh all the relevant factors.” Bibas, supra note 2, at 970. In addition, “[t]he separation of 
powers, courts hold, forbids judicial interference with prosecutorial discretion to decline to file 
charges.” Id. 
  Moreover, Bibas argues that even if “[j]udges may have some tools with which to check 
prosecutorial discretion in individual cases, . . . these tools miss deeper problems. The most 
important problems of prosecutorial discretion are systemic ones.” Id. at 972. According to Bibas: 
Individual trial judges are limited by the confines of particular cases and controversies. 
They are not well suited to take the synoptic, bird’s-eye view needed to police systemic 
concerns about equality, arbitrariness, leniency, and overcharging. They lack statistical 
training and expertise, as well as detailed information from prosecutors’ files. Their 
choices ex post are often crude and binary, requiring them either to find statistical 
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Again, however, these constraints may not be present in the context of 
the disciplinary process. 
First, because the proceedings will be confidential rather than 
adversarial, disciplinary proceedings may allow for broader discovery 
and investigation of the prosecutor’s actions and policies, without the 
necessary participation and access of defendants. Second, because the 
focus of inquiry will be the ethical conduct—and possible discipline—
of a prosecutor or an office, rather than considering an adjudicatory 
remedy to protect the substantive or procedural rights of a particular 
defendant, judges will expand the scope of examination, as necessary, 
to uncover broader patterns of behavior. Third, in exercising their 
inherent authority, judges will be less concerned about the kinds of 
separation of powers issues that arise in the adjudicatory setting.41 Thus, 
with greater access to information about prosecutors’ charging 
decisions, a wider range of cases to evaluate, and a stronger sense of 
authority, judges will be better positioned to determine whether these 
decisions constituted an ethical violation, both in individual cases and 
on a systemic level. 
CONCLUSION 
Among lawyers in the American legal system, prosecutors stand out 
in having a duty to seek justice.42 Although this duty applies to all 
aspects of the prosecutorial role, the extent to which prosecutors 
exercise discretion in carrying out their charging function arguably 
 
disparities unconstitutional or to put their imprimatur on them. 
 Id. at 973. In short, “[j]udicially enforceable models of equality are poorly suited to balance the 
myriad practical and policy considerations that prosecutors legitimately take into account.” Id. 
Therefore, he concludes, “[i]f judicial oversight is to mean anything, it will have to be coupled 
with some other measure to generate more concrete rules that judges can enforce.” Id. at 974.  
 41.  See Green & Levine, supra note 1, at Part III.A.  
 42.  See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935): 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a 
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as 
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal 
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. 
Id. at 88.  
  See also, e.g., United States v. Koyajan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Prosecutors 
are subject to constraints and responsibilities that don’t apply to other lawyers. While lawyers 
representing private parties may—indeed, must—do everything ethically permissible to advance 
their clients’ interests, lawyers representing the government in criminal cases serve truth and 
justice first.”); Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
607 (1999); Samuel J. Levine, Judicial Rhetoric and Lawyers’ Roles, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1989 (2015); Levine, supra note 31; Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial 
Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45 (1991). 
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entails a corresponding degree of obligation on their part to ensure that 
justice is served in the process of charging decisions. Nevertheless, in 
practice, commentators have raised substantial concerns over 
perceived and documented instances of prosecutorial abuse of the 
charging power, prompting various models for reform.43 
Building on my previous work with Bruce Green,44 this Essay 
observes that these proposals typically focus on legislative action or 
internal restructuring of prosecutorial offices, with relatively little 
discussion of a judicial response premised upon the authority of judges 
to regulate the work of prosecutors through the enactment and 
application of disciplinary rules. Yet, as leading scholars have noted, 
there are various obstacles that render the implementation of 
legislative responses or internal restrictions somewhat difficult to 
envision, if not altogether unlikely. Accordingly, the Essay explores the 
possible utility of disciplinary regulation as an avenue of reform, 
finding that a judicial response compares favorably with other 
proposals as a potential alternative that, as a practical matter, does not 
face many of the drawbacks of other models.45 
 
 43.  See supra notes 10–15 and accompanying text. 
 44.  See Green & Levine, supra note 1. 
 45.  Though beyond the scope of this Essay, this form of disciplinary review might be 
implemented through interpretation and application of current ethics rules or through the 
enactment of new ethics rules regulating the work of prosecutors.  For a descriptive and normative 
analysis of the implementation of disciplinary review, see Green & Levine, supra note 1. 
